Book Review: International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, by Anne Orford by Oman, Natalie
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 50, Issue 1 (Fall 2012) Article 11
Book Review: International Authority and the
Responsibility to Protect, by Anne Orford
Natalie Oman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Review
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Oman, Natalie. "Book Review: International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, by Anne Orford." Osgoode Hall Law Journal




INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, by Anne Orford 1
NATALIE OMAN 2
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, an emerging international legal principle, 
gained notoriety in 2011 when it was invoked by the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council to justify sanctions against the former Libyan leadership.3 In 
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, Anne Orford argues that 
the signifi cance of this principle has been underestimated by many legal scholars, 
who view it as lacking either original normative content or genuinely ‘legal’ character. 
Orford contests such assessments by documenting the UN’s use of the respon-
sibility to protect as the foundation of a normative account of a new kind of 
international executive rule. Orford asserts that this form of authority has been 
generated through UN-led practices of administration and policing in the 
decolonized world over the past half-century. She argues that the responsibility to 
protect is being employed as a powerful (and potentially dangerous) justifi cation 
for the reordering of relations of domestic and territorial jurisdiction resulting 
from these practices. At the same time, she contends, the principle raises funda-
mental constitutional questions about the subjects and agents of international 
law—questions that have largely been ignored by its most vocal advocates.
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) identifi ed an emerging principle of international law—the responsibility of 
states to protect the “human security” of their citizens.4 According to the ICISS’s 
1. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 235 pages.  
2. Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, University of Ontario Institute of Technology.
3. Th e targeted sanctions resolution also included a referral of the Libyan situation to the 
International Criminal Court for investigation. See SC Res 1970, UN SCOR, 2011, UN 
Doc S/RES/1970 (2011). Th is resolution opened the door to subsequent NATO-led military 
intervention in support of the revolutionary forces in Libya.
4. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Th e Responsibility to Protect 
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reading of crystallizing customary international law, when states fail to fulfi ll this 
fundamental role, the responsibility to protect devolves upon member states of 
the international community.5 Under the leadership of Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, a variant of the principle garnered the support of the 2005 World 
Summit. Th e responsibility to protect has since become the fulcrum of the UN’s 
twenty-fi rst century human-protection eff orts under Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon. Special Advisers on the Responsibility to Protect and on the Prevention 
of Genocide have been appointed to collaborate on the concept’s development 
and operationalization. Th e interpretation of the responsibility to protect now 
championed by the UN (the “RtoP”) is an abstemious one, holding that the 
principle applies only when threats to human security take one of four forms: 
possible genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. As 
with many academic interpretations of the responsibility to protect (but contrary 
to the ICISS’s original contention), a central feature of the RtoP perspective is the 
assertion that the principle is a moral and political one, lacking legal character.  
Although, or perhaps because, Orford documents the history and aspirations 
of the reigning UN vision of the responsibility to protect with thoroughness and 
insight, she breaks with the RtoP perspective on just this point. For Orford, it is 
apparent not only that the responsibility to protect is a legal principle, but also 
that it is the concept’s distinctive form of legal normativity that is the source of 
its reach and growing infl uence. Orford’s primary interest in the responsibility to 
protect lies in the way in which it represents and gives formal expression to the 
“protective authority”6 that international actors have claimed as their justifi cation 
for intervening in decolonized states since 1960. In the fi rst and second of the 
linked essays that comprise the book, Orford traces the emergence, since the 
mid-twentieth century, of dispersed practices of protection under the auspices 
of the UN in tandem with the genesis of an open-ended international executive 
authority asserted by consecutive Secretaries-Generals, beginning with Dag Ham-
marskjöld. Orford argues that the responsibility to protect concept has served as 
a vehicle for the integration of these two complementary developments into a 
rationalized and coherent account of international authority. Th is assessment fi ts 
neatly with Secretary-General Ban’s description of the UN’s RtoP agenda over the 
past half-decade as one of “doctrinal elaboration and institutional expression” of 
the concept, in service of the UN’s primary role as an arbiter of global standards.7
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) at 15.
5. Ibid at 17. 
6. Supra note 1 at 3.
7. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Human Protection and the 21st Century United Nations” 
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However, despite this descriptive congruity, the conclusions Orford reaches 
regarding the nature and import of the responsibility to protect diff er from the 
dominant UN narrative in several key respects. While Orford agrees that the 
responsibility to protect “is not a form of law that imposes duties on subjects,”8 
she asserts that it nonetheless does possess legal normativity.9 Orford claims that 
the responsibility to protect functions as law in the sense that it “confers powers 
‘of a public or offi  cial nature’ and … allocates jurisdiction”10 (analogous to, she 
argues, Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations [“Charter”], which estab-
lishes the political authority of the Secretary-General).11 Orford’s view is that the 
responsibility to protect has been wrongly deemed insignifi cant or lacking in 
normative content because it has been consistently mis-categorized by critics. She 
argues that most commentators have only assessed the responsibility to protect’s 
merits as a form of law that imposes duties and thus have naturally found it wanting. 
In fact, Orford observes, the responsibility to protect belongs to another class 
of laws entirely: laws that confer powers and create a “discretionary mandate” 
that provides legal authorization for particular classes of activities.12 Th us, Orford 
claims, “Th e vocabulary of ‘responsibility’ works here as a language for conferring 
authority and allocating powers rather than as a language for imposing binding 
obligations and commanding obedience.”13
Orford regards the UN’s adoption of the responsibility to protect as an 
instance of a larger phenomenon that she traces back to the Holy Roman Empire: 
the assertion of jurisdiction without territory on the grounds that the agent who 
claims international authority represents universal interests that trump those of 
territorially-bounded entities. In her chapter, “Who Decides? Who Interprets? 
Jurisdiction, Recognition and the Institutionalisation of Protection,”14 Orford 
suggests that the UN has employed the responsibility to protect as a justifi catory 
ideology to strengthen its claim that it represents the universal and, under certain 
circumstances, that it legitimately exercises the functions of particular sovereigns 
(Cyril Foster Lecture, delivered at Oxford University, 2 February 2011), online: United 
Nations <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=1064>.  
8. Supra note 1 at 25. 
9. Ibid.  
10. Ibid. Orford is here adverting to HLA Hart’s famous classifi catory scheme that divides laws 
into duty-imposing or power-conferring types.  See HLA Hart, Th e Concept of Law (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1961) at 28. 
11. 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7.
12. Supra note 1 at 26. 
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid at 139. 
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as a consequence. Orford points out that this contention depends upon a func-
tionalist account of international society, which views sovereignty as consisting 
of a bundle of competencies, privileges, and immunities. According to this line 
of thinking, when crises occur that threaten human security, the bundle is disag-
gregated and the responsibility to protect is interpreted by the UN as off ering 
a normative justification for its (temporary) acquisition of some of these 
unbundled competencies. 
Th e UN’s grounds for assigning itself the role of default sovereign in such 
circumstances lie in its claim to neutrality. However, Orford denies the validity of 
this assertion of impartiality, pointing to the way that grounding authority in the 
capacity to protect has the eff ect of privileging certain types of domestic actors and 
institutions, as well as particular forms of political, social, and economic organi-
zation. As she puts it: “To characterise a situation as one of civil war or anarchy 
[necessary for triggering the responsibility to protect] is to register the absence 
of some preconceived form of integrative force.”15 Th is kind of force, of course, 
looks much like the apparatus of a centralized and vertically integrated state. 
In this respect and others, the UN is not neutral among competing actors 
and agendas; this bias is consistent with both the Charter-mandated legal centrism 
of the organization and with the UN’s preferred reading of the addressees of the 
responsibility to protect. Th e UN’s interpretation of the principle envisions a 
global constitutional order in which the agents empowered to bear and to act 
upon the responsibility to protect are in the fi rst instance states or, if they default, 
coalitions of states acting under the auspices of the UN. (Orford notes that, in 
its pared-down reformulation of the ICISS’s responsibility to protect, the UN 
World Summit of 2005 excised any hint that entities other than states or 
UN-mandated combinations of states were eligible to invoke the responsibility 
to protect). As a consequence of these commitments, the responsibility to protect 
and the UN human protection agenda to which it contributes are being developed 
in a way that reinforces the hierarchical advantage of states in transnational society 
at a critical moment of transition in the evolution of global law. Orford draws 
our attention to the fact that this use of the principle is not a consequence of any 
feature intrinsic to it.
In her chapters “How to Recognise Lawful Authority: Hobbes, Schmitt and 
the Responsibility to Protect ”16 and “Th e Question of Status and the Subject of 
Protection,”17 Orford turns her critical gaze to another tradition of politico-legal 
15. Ibid at 133.
16. Ibid at 109.
17. Ibid at 189. 
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theory that undergirds the responsibility to protect principle. Th is line of argument 
begins with Th omas Hobbes’ contention, born of the English Civil War, that the 
authority of the state is premised upon its ability to defend its subjects in times 
of political upheaval—a privileging of de facto authority later embraced most 
notably by Carl Schmitt in the wake of the First World War. 
Orford suggests that this tradition is the progenitor of the dominant justifi -
cation for projecting international authority into the decolonized world since the 
mid-twentieth century: the ascribed absence of centralized institutions capable 
of exercising a protective function.18 She goes on to show how reliance upon the 
capacity to exercise protection as the grounds for authority served as the rationale 
for developing techniques of control to manage decolonization, including 
disciplinary surveillance, security sector reform, administration, and controls on 
the movement of peoples.19 But as Orford deftly reveals, the eff ectiveness of this 
functionalist approach to asserting authority hangs upon its avoidance of the 
question of that authority’s normative foundations, and with it, the question of 
juridical status—that is, the relation between state, ruler, and people.20 In order 
for this new administrative order of executive rule to be accepted, the question of 
who the state is—that is, “the legal subject with the status to represent the welfare 
of the people and to lay down the law”21—must be avoided.
Similarly, the decision that human protection measures must be implemented 
by a ‘universal’ authority has to be depicted as algorithmic in character, rather 
than as the quintessentially political and context-specifi c choice that Orford 
rightly argues it to be. As Orford succinctly puts the matter:
Th e decision that a state needs help to protect its population does not simply involve 
the assessment of facts, but requires an account of the social conditions under which 
protection can best be guaranteed and whether there are other community values 
that are more important than guaranteeing security in a given situation. Making 
decisions about whether and how a government can best protect its population goes 
to the heart of politics.22 
18. Ibid at 133.
19. Ibid at 193.
20. Ibid at 195, 206.
21. Ibid at 206.
22. Ibid at 183. Th e prevailing interpretation of the responsibility to protect relies on the 
(unsupported) assumption that consensus exists on the content and the preeminence of 
“human security”; such a consensus (if it existed) would obviate the need for such public 
deliberation. (On this point, see Natalie Oman, “Hannah Arendt & the Right to Have 
Rights” (2010) 9 J of Human Rights 279.) 
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Although she does not frame it in these terms, one of Orford’s main 
achievements in this passage lie in drawing attention to the promiscuity of the 
responsibility to protect principle. She documents but does not fully thematize 
the fact that the principle lends itself to cooptation by multiple juridical projects, 
both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary.23 Th e principle can, for example, 
act as the normative basis for an account of the lawfulness of a form of authority 
founded upon the capacity to ensure human security, and also serve to disrupt 
the international legal consensus regarding the irrelevance of the question of who 
the ‘state’ is.24
In her conclusion, Orford chooses to be optimistic about the role that the 
responsibility to protect might play in the future. She argues that in this postco-
lonial moment, any attempt to implement the principle must necessarily remind 
us of the contested character of judgments about the “forms and ends” of lawful 
authority.25 Th ose who would use the principle to justify the link between authority 
and protection must therefore acknowledge the ugly history of interventions by 
“defend[ing] the utility of their actions in concrete situations.”26 At the same 
time, the principle’s invocation compels the rest of us to attend to the political 
nature of the task of translating ideas of protection and responsibility into specifi c 
polities and legal rules.27
Orford’s book off ers a powerful and nuanced argument for the relevance of 
the responsibility to protect to the remaking of the international legal landscape. 
It critically documents the continuity of control and administration practices 
now being rationalized under the rubric of the principle with the technologies 
of governmentality fi rst introduced by the UN in the period of decolonization 
(with roots that date back much farther). It identifi es how the privileging of the 
centralized state, which is one of the aims of such practices, is reiterated in the 
legal centrism of the UN’s interpretation of the responsibility to protect. 
However, Orford’s even-handedness in acknowledging the strengths of 
that interpretation and recording its dangers is the source of one of two minor 
frustrations for the reader. After demonstrating an evident appreciation of the 
conservative and inegalitarian consequences of this legal centrist reading, one 
might naturally anticipate that Orford would off er an alternative, remedial 
23. Supra note 1 at 208.
24. I explore this theme in A Philosophical Investigation of the Responsibility to Protect, ch 5, 
forthcoming in 2014. 
25. Supra note 1 at 212. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Ibid at 210, 212.  
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account of the responsibility to protect’s ambit; however, Orford does not 
challenge the agenda by applying the internal logic of the principle itself. Why, 
for example, does the protective function asserted by UN proponents of the 
RtoP vest only in states, and not in any other candidates? Similarly, the claim 
Orford makes concerning the legal character of the responsibility to protect in 
the early chapters of the book is one of her most interesting and contentious 
contributions, yet once again the reader wishes for more. Th is argument would 
be strengthened by looking more closely into the genealogy of the principle in 
classic sources of international law; I have argued elsewhere that such an exami-
nation reveals the principle’s parallel sources in both customary international law 
and general principles of law.28
In the face of Orford’s achievement in this book, these are minor cavils. 
As the preceding discussion attests, the book works most eff ectively not as an 
attempt to advocate for or to develop the responsibility to protect, but as a pene-
trating survey of the fundamental questions about international law raised by the 
principle’s rise to prominence and as a warning against complacency about the 
possibility of its neutral use. Th e main accomplishment of these keenly observed 
essays lies in tracking the rise of a new form of international governance that is 
facilitated and justifi ed by the discourse of the responsibility to protect. 
28. Natalie Oman, “Could R2P Justify a No-Fly Zone in the Absence of Security Council 
Approval? Natalie Oman, “Could R2P Justify a No-Fly Zone in the Absence of Security 
Council Approval?” Opinio Juris (17 March 2011), online: Opinio Juris 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2011/03/17could-rtop-justify-a-no-fl y-zone-in-the-absence-of-
security-council-approval/>.
